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Based on cross-country data from a wide range of developed and developing countries, this 
study, using an original and synthetic indicator, empirically analyses the incidence of openness to 
trade on the level of core labour standards. In the first part of our study, when the model is estimated 
through the OLS method, we find a positive and significant influence of trade on core labour 
standards. However, literature leads us to assume that trade openness is endogenous. In the second 
part, using the instrumental variables (IV) method, we show that openness to trade is no longer 
significant. We test different vectors of instruments that validate the robustness of our results. We 
conclude that, in the ongoing debate about the incidence of trade openness on the level of core labour 
standard, increasing openness would not lead to a levelling down, but rather labour standards would 
depend on national characteristics such as economic and social development. 
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  1 1. INTRODUCTION 
 
Globalisation creates competition between countries that have differences in wage levels, labour 
market regulations and social policies. Diversity of the countries’ characteristics feeds debate on 
whether to enter into minimum labour standards agreements before opening trade, in fear of unfair 
competition and the risks of a levelling down of labour standards.  
 
Among the 174 conventions and 190 recommendations administered by the ILO, the current 
debate focuses on four labour standards regarded by the ILO as “Core Labour Standard”: freedom 
from forced labour, the abolition of exploitative forms of child labour, the prohibition of 
discrimination, the respect of freedom of association and collective bargaining (ILO, 86
th Labour 
International Conference, 1998). This standard is applicable to every country regardless of its 
distinctive characteristics. 
 
Up to now, only a few studies have attempted to illustrate the key contributors to the level of 
core labour standards and in particular to discuss the influence of trade openness. The ultimate purpose 
of these studies is to provide an answer to the following question: does keen competition, through the 
increase in trade flows, lead to a levelling down of the core labour standards? The debate remains 
largely theoretical and there are no fully satisfying empirical studies addressing the issue. Indeed, 
many authors focus only on one of the four core labour standards: OECD (2000) deals with union 
rights; Shelburne (2001) and Edmonds and Pavcnik (2002) only tackle child labour. More recently, 
Busse (2004) analyses the four core standards but its indicators of the effective level of core labour 
standards are dubious.  
 
In this paper, we estimate the incidence of openness to trade on the level of the four labour 
standards. Unlike the existing empirical studies, we base our findings on an original and synthetic 
indicator, which we have constructed.  
 
  2 Section 2 presents the ongoing debate about the risks of a levelling down of the core standards 
when openness to trade increases. In Section 3, we describe our variables and our sample followed by 
a few descriptive statistics. Section 4 is devoted to econometrical estimations and to the analysis of the 
results. Finally, in Section 5, we draw our conclusions. 
 
 
2.  THE DEBATE  
 
The recent literature devoted to the incidence of trade on the level of core labour standards seeks 
to determine whether there exists a risk of levelling down. In other words, does trade openness lead to 
a decrease in core labour standards?  
 
2.1 Theoretical  arguments 
 
Some authors point out that the level of core labour standards is first and foremost a national 
choice, which depends on the level of economic and social development, the factor endowments and 
the cultural values (Bhagwati, 1995; Srinivasan, 1996). In comparison to these factors, the influence of 
trade should be negligible. Freeman (1994) adds another argument to assess the neutrality of openness 
to trade: a country which wants high labour standards can always “pay for” it by combining a 
devaluation, a decrease in wage and a tax. As a result, the cost of labour standards can be shared 
between employers, employees and all consumers. 
 
However, even if the level core labour standards results from national choice, trade openness 
can have an incidence on the different determinants of this choice. In particular, there is a consensus of 
the literature that income level and its distribution are one of the main explanatory factors for the level 
of labour standards. Insofar as openness to trade influences these two variables, it can also modify the 
choices concerning labour standards. The theoretical model developed by Casella (1996) points out the 
  3 casual links
1: openness first leads to a change in relative prices, which means an increase in the 
national income, a variation in the remuneration of the different production factors and, consequently, 
a change in the level of labour standards. Casella (1996) describes different cases, notably according to 
the structure of trade flows (perfect competition with inter-industry trade or imperfect competition 
with intra-industry trade), and concludes that in many cases, trade is likely to lead to a levelling up of 
labour standards. 
 
Nevertheless, for several authors, the above analysis is not sufficient because it neglects a key 
characteristic of labour standards in open economies: these standards can be used as a political 
economic instrument and, more precisely, as a substitute to more traditional trade policies (see the 
theoretical model proposed by Bagwell and Staiger, 1998). Indeed, low labour standards can 
correspond to a deliberate strategy to lower production costs and to promote exports, at least in 
countries where abuses are more important in export sectors than in the rest of the economy (OECD, 
1996; Rodrik, 1996). When faced with such a strategy, the trade partner is, in turn, incited to lower its 
own standards. Games theory is the best way to represent these interactions. As illustrated by different 
examples, the equilibrium depends on the winnings expected from the respect or the violation of 
labour standards (Srinivasan, 1996; Noor, 1997). For Siroen (1996), there is a real risk of a prisoner 
dilemma, that is, a situation where each partner loosens its standards to face the competition. But a 
levelling down is not certain. Even if labour standards are used as a trade policy instrument, it could be 
attractive to tighten them for various reasons. On one hand, as shown by Brown et al. (1996), a large 
country, abundant in labour, could have an incentive to adopt higher labour standards due to their 
positive impact on the terms of trade. On the other hand, core labour standard enforcement is not 
necessarily harmful for competitiveness. For example, it could enhance innovation, generate 
productivity gains and help to face the international competition that is more and more based on 
productivity, quality and technology rather than only on prices (Aggarwal, 1995; OECD, 1996). 
 
                                                            
1 Casella’s model deals with all types of standards (technical, social or environmental). It can be applied in particular to labor 
standards as they are an increasing function of income. 
  4 2.2 Empirical  arguments 
 
To settle the argument, empirical analyses are scare. Moreover, they often focus on only one of 
the four standards. In its study largely devoted to trade unions, OECD (2000) presents few correlations 
between these standards and the degree of trade protection, based on a sample of 44 developing 
countries. It is shown that the more a country is opened, the more it respects trade unions’ rights. 
Thanks to temporal analysis based only on countries that have known trade liberalization, OECD also 
concludes that openness to trade has never been followed by a degradation of union rights. Such an 
analysis is obviously not sufficient because it does not take into account the other determinants of 
union rights. The econometrical case study proposed by Edmonds and Pavnicks (2002) is more 
complete but remains devoted to one standard, child labour. From panel data, they conclude that trade 
openness, in this case the removal of the quota on the exports of rice, led to a decrease in child labour, 
through the increase of the real income of an important part of the population
2.  
 
The empirical work of Busse (2004) is the only study focused on the four core labour standards. 
The same econometrical model is successively applied to each standard to identify the determinants of 
core labour standards (openness to trade, economic development level, human capital endowment and 
regional dummies). His results show that trade openness decreases the prevalence of discrimination 
and child labour even if the coefficients are weakly significant. The influence of trade on union rights 
and forced labour is more ambiguous. As complete as this study may be, it still suffers from two 
limitations. First of all, the indicators used to measure the level of core labour standards are doubtful. 
In particular, union rights and freedom from forced labour are proxied by the Freedom House index, 
which measures the respect of civil liberties in general
3. Secondly, the econometric model doesn’t 
tackle the potential endogeneity of several explanatory variables that we address in the next section.  
 
                                                            
2 On the contrary, if the rice was the imported good, trade openness should lead to a decrease in the income of households 
and thus to an increase in child labour. 
3 Including, for example, freedom of press, due process of law… 
  5 3.  DATA, SAMPLE AND DESCRIPTIVE STATISTICS 
 
We propose a new empirical study on the determinants of the level of core labour standards, 
focused on the impact of trade openness. Our study attempts, at the same time, to shed light on the 
theoretical debate and to offset the limits of existing empirical studies. In this section, we present our 
original indicator of core labour standards and some descriptive statistics. 
 
3.1   A synthetic indicator of core labour standards 
 
Since no reliable indicator exists for assessing the mean level of the four core labour standards, 
we have built an original and synthetic indicator. This indicator is based on the exploitation of a new 
database associating a large amount of quantitative and qualitative information from various sources
4. 
Appendice 1 presents a table that summarizes the criteria retained to measure the level of each 
standard and cites the sources used.  
 
Initially, each standard is processed separately following the method proposed by OECD to 
elaborate its base regarding union rights (1996 and 2000). To rate each country’s level of 
discrimination, child labour violation and obstacles to union rights, the countries are placed in four 
categories, from 1 (total violation) to 4 (total respect of the standard), according to the observed degree 
of violation. Because of the scarcity of the information available,
 only three categories are retained for 
forced labour. Next, the synthetic indicator (referred to as CLS) is defined as the sum of the index of 
the categories previously built for each standard. This sum is then included in 0 (absence of the 
standards) to 1 (respect of the four standards)
5.  
 
                                                            
4 Only the information that was common to at least two sources has been kept. 
5 For example, information on Argentina reveals that child labour, discrimination and obstacles to union rights exist but 
remain limited and that there is no forced labour. Thus Argentina belongs to category 3 for the first three standards and to 
category 4 for the fourth. The sum of the intermediate scores S equals 13. The formula ((S-4)/12) gives in this case a 
quantitative synthetic indicator equals to 0.75. 
 
  6 The database for the main trading countries is constructed for the period, 1995-1997. It should 
be noted that, of the first 70 exporting and importing countries, some Eastern and Middle-Eastern 
countries, for which there is no reliable information on core labour standards, are excluded. Moreover, 
the main Sub-Saharan trading countries have been added in order to represent this continent in our 
database. Finally, the sample covers 40 developing countries and 25 developed countries that represent 
more than 90% of the world GDP and of the world trade.
6 Appendice 2 lists the countries of our 
sample with their corresponding value for CLS. 
 
3.2   Descriptive statistics 
 
The indicator, CLS, allows identification of the countries with low labour standards. First of all, 
according to the endogenous social development hypothesis, Figure 1 shows a positive correlation 
between the national wealth, represented here by the average GNP per capita between 1995 and 1997 
(at PPP, in current US $) and the level of core labour standards. 
 














Sources : CLS (authors’ database) ; GNP (World Development Indicators, World Bank, 2002). 
 
Secondly, Figure 2 presents the incidence of trade on core labour standards.  
 
                                                            
6 In the econometric estimations, the number of observations can be inferior because of missing data for the different 
explanatory variables. 
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Sources : CLS (authors’ database) ; GNP (World Development Indicators, World Bank, 2002). 
 
When trade openness is measured by the sum of exports and imports as a percentage of the 
GDP
7, a positive though very weak correlation (Figure 2) appears. R² = 5% and is significant at only 
7%. In fact, both trade openness and the level of core labour standards depend on numerous 
determinants (for example, the level of economic development) that are not yet controlled for and 
potentially distort an accurate relation. Thus, these results call for an econometric and more in depth 
analysis. 
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7 Exports, imports and GDP are in current US dollars.  4. ECONOMETRIC  ESTIMATIONS 
 
In this section, we present an econometric framework to identify the determinants of the level of 
core labour standards, and more precisely, to highlight the impact of the openness to trade.  
 
The dependent variable is the CLS indicator. It should be related to the openness to trade but 
also to the economic and social development, as shown by Busse (2004). Consequently, along with 
Trade, three control variables are retained.  
 
GNP, that is, the average GNP per capita between 1995 and 1997 (at PPP, in current US$), 
represents the economic development. In compliance with the descriptive analysis, it is expected to 
positively influence the CLS indicator.  
 
Schooling, that is, the average level of education between 1995 and 1997, represents social 
development. Intuitively, it should be positive since the more education people possess, the less they 
accept to be exploited. Hence, we can assume that the education level is directly and positively linked 
to CLS. The education level is represented by the average number of school years in the population 
aged 15 years and more
8.  
 
To control for historical and cultural factors, regional dummy variables have also been included: 
Africa, Middle East and Asia correspond to African, Middle East and Asiatic countries. In these 




                                                            
8 This variable is preferred to other education indicators for two reasons. First, as a specifical stock variable is necessary to 
define the human capital level, school enrollment ratios that are largely used to represent the national level of human capital, 
must be excluded. Second, if one stock variable like the literacy rate can be appropriate to differentiate developing countries 
(Busse, 2004), it cannot be used when the sample mixes developed and developing countries because the variability between 
developed countries is insufficient. 
9 Dummies for Europe and America have been excluded from the regressions and thus act as the reference variables. 
  9 4.1 OLS  regressions 
 
First, we estimate the following equation using the OLS method:  
ε ς π ϑ γ β α + + + + + + = Asia MiddleEast Africa Schooling GNP Trade CLS  (1) 
with  , an error term.  ε
The estimation results for the cross-sectional OLS regressions are reported in Table 1.  
 
TABLE 1: DETERMINANTS OF CLS (OLS METHOD) 
1  Dependant variable: CLS, synthetic indicator of core labour standards 
Constant  0.17
* (0.1)  0.14 (0.1) 
Trade  0.0008
** (0.0004)   
Trade_SW    0.11
* (0.07) 
GNP  0.00002
*** (0.00)  0.00002
*** (0.00) 
Schooling  0.04
*** (0.01)  0.03
* (0.02) 
Africa  -0.08 (0.08)  -0.02 (0.07) 
Middle East  -0.07 (0.06)  0.02 (0.07) 
Asia  -0.27
*** (0.06)  -0.21
*** (0.05) 
R-squared  0.82  0.83 
Observations  60  54 
Sources : GNP and Trade (World Development Indicators 2002, World Bank) ; Schooling (Barro and Lee, 2000) ; 
Trade_SW (Sachs and Warner, 1995). 
Significance level : *** 1%, ** 5%, * 10%. The standards errors are noted between brackets. 
 
The two columns estimate the same equation but they differ from each other by the indicator of 
openness used. In the first column, openness to trade is measured by the ratio of imports and exports to 
GDP. In the second column, it is represented by the indicator of Sachs and Warner (1995) which 
classifies countries as 0 (closed) or 1 (opened)
10.  
 
These two regressions confirm the primordial impact of the economic development on the level 
of core labour standards. The estimated coefficient of GNP is positive and highly significant (at the 
0.01 level). Nevertheless, the strictly endogenous social development thesis should be used cautiously 
as Schooling and Asia are also significant. In fact, after controlling for economic development, the 
                                                            
10 A country is defined as closed if it meets any one of the following criteria: tariffs rate of 40 per cent or more; non-tariff 
barriers covering 40 per cent of trade or more; black market exchange rate premium that is depreciated by 20 per cent or 
more relative to the official exchange rate; a state monopoly on major exports; and socialist economic system. 
  10more educated a population is, the more CLS are enforced. Moreover, Asia is the only significant 
dummy : because of institutional, cultural and/or historical reasons,:  this region is characterised by a 
significantly low level of labour standards. 
 
As regards openness to trade, the results presented in Table 1 suggest that even when using 
Trade_SW, the measure of openness from Sachs and Warner (1995), increased openness to trade is 
positively associated with the level of core labour standards. Consequently, a phenomenon of levelling 
down on workers’ rights should be excluded. At this stage, we confirm the conclusion of Busse (2004) 
who argues that openness to trade has a positive influence at least on discrimination against females 
and child labour in employment, education and health. But such a conclusion is premature because of 
the assumed endogeneity of any explanatory variables that would bias the OLS estimators. 
 
4.2  Instrumental Variables estimations 
 
The need for the IV method to estimate the causal effect of openness to trade on core labour 
standards is motivated by at least two sources of endogeneity that could bias the OLS estimates. First, 
as shown by Van Beers (1998), the level of core labour standards can directly influence the volume of 
trade by its effects on both the quantity of labour available in the economy and the labour allocation 
between the different sectors of activity. Second, Bagwell and Staiger (1998) suggest a substitutability 
between core labour standards and trade policy, which only indicates a relation between these two 
variables but doesn't state a causal link.  
GNP and Schooling may be endogenous too. As noted by many authors (OECD, 1996; Piore, 
1994), core labour standards promote physical and human capital accumulation, but also productivity 
gains and, at last , economic growth. The negative impact of core labour standards on human capital 
accumulation is theoretically evident for child labour (OECD, 1996). It can also be shown for 
discrimination to the extent that it generally exists both on the labour market and in the access to 
education. And we can assume that other labour standards also have an influence on human capital 
  11accumulation if the core labour standards violation goes hand in hand with manpower exploitation 
which is incompatible with human capital accumulation (Siroën, 1996). Consequently, Schooling may 
be endogenous too. 
 
To correct these endogeneity biases, we use the IV method which assumes that three variables 
are endogenous: Trade, GNP and Schooling. Hence the model can be written as follows: 
ε λ 1 1 Z Trade + =  (2) 
ε ϕ 2 2 Z GNP + =  (3) 
ε ϑ 3 3 Z Schooling + =  (4) 
ε ξ η κ γ β α + + + + + + = Asia Middleeast Africa ling o ˆ Scho P N ˆ G de a ˆ Tr CLS  (5) 
 
with Z1, Z2 and Z3, vectors of regressors
11 and ε1, ε2 and ε3, measurement errors. Various instrumental 
variables are included in the vectors Z1, Z2 and Z3. They significantly explain the endogenous variables 
but, in accordance with the IV method, they do not influence core labour standards. 
 
The new estimations are presented in Table 2. We have kept the ratio of imports and exports to 
GDP to measure openness to trade (preferably to Sachs and Warner’s indicator) although it is very 
general and usually criticized. In fact, this indicator is suited for our study because it accounts for both 
the integration of a country in the world economy and for its exposition to international competition. 
 
In the two columns, GNP and Schooling are instrumented by two lagged variables: the GNP per 
capita (GNP-1)  and  the human capital (Schooling-1), in average between 1975 and 1985. Lagged 
variables are traditional instruments for current variables (see for example Edwards, 1998; Esteve-
Volart, 2000). On the contrary, to validate the robustness of our estimations, trade openness is 
instrumented in two ways. In column 1, we use Coast, defined as the part of the total country area 
                                                            
11 These vectors include both instrumental variables and exogenous variables from initial model (Africa, Middle East and 
Asia). 
  12located to more than a hundred kilometres from the coasts. This geographical variable is used as a 
proxy of “natural” openness. In column 2, we use Pop and Distance: Pop is the size of a country 
measured by its population in 1997 and Distance is the kilometric distance between a country and one 
of the three nearest world economic centres (USA, European Union and Japan). These two variables 
are extracted from the gravity model, which is usually retained to instrument an indicator of trade 
openness (Frankel and Romer, 1999; Rodrik et al., 2002). Appendice 3 reports the first-stage 
regressions (equations (2), (3) and (4))
 12. 
 
TABLE 2: DETERMINANTS OF CLS (IV METHOD) 
1  Dependant variable: CLS, synthetic indicator of core labour standards 
 Instruments:  Coast  
(and GNP-1, Schooling-1, Africa, 
Middle East, Asia) 
Instruments: Pop, Distance  
(and GNP-1, Schooling-1, Africa, 
Middle East, Asia) 
Constant  0.17 (0.1)  0.16 (0.1) 
Trade  0.001 (0.002)  0.0009 (0.001) 
GNP  0.00002
*** (0.00)  0.00002
*** (0.00) 
Schooling  0.03
* (0.02)  0.04
** (0.02) 
Africa  -0.07 (0.1)  -0.06 (0.09) 
Middle East  -0.06 (0.07)  -0.05 (0.07) 
Asia  -0.29
*** (0.1)  -0.28
*** (0.07) 
R-squared  0.82  0.83 
Observations  55  55 
Sources : GNP and Trade (World Development Indicators 2002, World Bank) ; Schooling (Barro and Lee, 2000). 
Significance level : *** 1%, ** 5%, * 10%. The standards errors are noted between brackets. 
  
Table 2 shows that after having corrected endogeneity biases with the instrumental variables 
method,  GNP,  Schooling and Asia remain significant determinants of the level of core labour 
standards. These results are basically in line with those of the OLS estimations. On the contrary, 
openness to trade now has a positive but not statistically significant influence on core labour standards. 
Given that two vectors of instruments are tested, we can conclude that this result is robust. Hence, 
openness to trade should have no direct impact on core labour standards.  
 
                                                            
12 When we regress residuals from equation (5) on instrumental variables, none of the instrumental variables is significant so 
we can conclude that the quality of our instruments is good.  
  13This result runs contrary to the commonplace idea that increasing openness should lead to a 
levelling down of labour standards. However, neither does it allow the conclusion that the incidence of 
trade is positive since the  variable measuring trade openness is not significant. It only calls into 





There is no theoretical consensus regarding whether trade openness affects positively or 
negatively, and to what extent, the level of the four core labour standards. Our paper has aimed to 
remove this incertitude by means of an empirical study based on the estimation of an econometrical 
model in which the dependant variable is an original and synthetic indicator of the level of core labour 
standards. This indicator is based on a large database of quantitative and qualitative information about 
the actual situation as regards labour standards for 40 developing countries and 25 developed 
countries. 
 
To begin with, using the OLS method, we have shown a positive incidence of openness to trade 
on the core labour standards. This is consistent with others empirical studies but we assume that these 
results are biased because some explanatory variables, in particular, trade openness, are probably 
endogenous. The IV method has allowed us to correct this endogeneity bias and leads us to a different 
conclusion. In our sample, openness to trade has no more impact on core labour standards. We 
therefore conclude that the aggregated level of these standards is first and foremost a national choice, 
depending on economic and social development levels and also on cultural values. 
  14References 
 
Aggarwal M. (1995), "International Trade and the Role of Labor Standards", US International Trade 
Commission, Working Paper N°95-06-C, Office of Economics, June.  
Bagwell K. and Staiger R.W. (1998), « The Simple Economics of Labor Standards and the GATT », 
NBER, Working Paper Series, N°6604. 
Barro R. and J. W. Lee (2000), International Data on Educational Attainment  : Updates and 
Implications, CID Working Paper n°42, April. 
Bhagwati J. (1995), « Trade Liberalization and « Fair Trade » demands : Addressing the Enviromental 
and Labour Standards Issues », World Economy, vol. 18, n°6, November, pp. 745-759. 
Brown D., A. Deardorff and R. Stern. (1996), « International Labour Standars and Trade : A Theorical 
Analysis », in Bhagwati et Hudec (eds.), Fair Trade and Harmonization : Prerequisities for Free 
Trade ?, MA: MIT Press, Cambridge, chapitre 3. 
Busse M. (2004), «  On the Determinants of Core Labour Standards : the Case of Developing 
Countries », Economic Letters, Vol.83, pp.211-217.  
Casella A. (1996), « On Standards and Trade : a Review of Simple Results », in Bhagwati et Hudec 
(eds.),  Fair Trade and Harmonization : Prerequisities for Free Trade ?, MA: MIT Press, 
Cambridge. 
Edmonds E. and A. Pavnicks (2002), "Does Globalization Increase Child labor  ? Evidence from 
Vietnam", NBER, Working Paper Series, N°8760. 
Edwards S. (1998), "Openness, productivity and growth : what do we really know ?", The Economic 
Journal, Vol. 108, march, pp. 383-398. 
Esteve-Volart B. (2000), "Sex discrimination and Growth", IMF Working Paper, WP/00/84, April. 
Frankel J. and Romer D. (1999), "Does trade cause growth ?", American Economic review, Vol. 89, 
N°3, pp. 379-399 
Freeman R. (1994), « A Hard-Headed Look at Labor Standards » in Schoepfle G. and K. Swinnerton 
(eds.), International Labor Standards and Global Integration : Proceeding of a Symposium, US 
department of Labor, Washington D.C., July , pp. 26-33. 
ILO (1998), International Labour Conference : ILO Declaration on Fundamental Principles and Rights 
at Work, 86th session, Geneva, June. 
Noor W. (1997), Labor Standards and International Trade  : Four Essays, Ph. D. Dissertation, 
Columbia University. 
OECD (1996 et 2000), Le commerce, l’emploi et les normes du travail, OECD, Paris. 
Piore M. J. (1994), « International Labor Standards and Business Strategies » in Schoepfle G. and K. 
Swinnerton (eds.), International Labor Standards and Global Integration  : Proceeding of a 
Symposium, US Department of Labor, Washington D.C., July. 
  15Rodrik D. (1996), « Labor Standards in International Trade : Do they Matter and What We Do About 
Them? » Lawrence R., Rodrik D. and Whalley J. (1996), « Emerging Agenda for Global Trade : 
High Stakes for Developping Countries », Policy Essay N°20, Overseas Development Council, 
Washington D.C., Chap. 2. 
Rodrik D., Subramanian A. and Trebbi F. (2002), « Institutions Rule : The Primacy of Institutions 
over Geography and Integration in Economic Development”, Mimeo. 
Sachs J.D. and Warner A. (1995), «  Economic Reforms and the Process of Global Integration  », 
Brookings Papers on Economic Activity, pp. 1-118. 
Shelburne R. (2001), «  An explanation of the international variation in the prevalence of child 
labour », World Economy, Vol. 24, pp.359-378. 
Siroën J-M. (1996), « Existe-t-il une justification économique à la clause sociale ? Quelques éléments 
de réflexion », in De Melo J. et P. Guillaumont, Commerce Nord-Sud, Migration et délocalisation, 
Economica, Paris, pp. 291-307. 
Srinivasan T. N. (1996), « Trade and Human Rights », Center Discussion Paper n°765, Economic 
Growth Center, Yale University, December. 
Van Beers C. (1998), "Labour Standards and Trade Flows of OECD Countries", The World Economy, 
Vol. 21, n°1, January. 
World Bank (2002), World Development Indicators. 
 
  16Appendice 1 : Criteria to Evaluate the Effective Level of Core Labor Standards 
  Criteria    Sources
 
Child Labor 
-  Number of Children working 
 
-  Economic activity  and type of work  
 
-  Working conditions and remuneration 
- US Department of Labor, 1994 et 1995, By The Sweat and Toil of Children, Vol. 1 et 2. 
- US Department of State, 1997, Country Report on Human Right Practices for 1997, section 6.d. 
- International Confederation of Free Trade Unions (ICFTU), Internationally-Recognized Core Labour 
Standards : Report for the WTO General Council review of the trade policies, Survey for each country  
- Children’s Labor force participation rate in 1996 (% of the 10-14 years old).  
Source : World Bank, 2002, World Development Indicators 2002 







Existence and extent of forced labor. 
- ILO, 2001, Stopping Forced Labor, Part I, Geneva 
- ILO, 1999, Report of the Committee of Experts on the Application of Conventions and 
Recommendations , Report III (Part 1A), Geneva. 
- US Department of State, 1997, Ibid., section 6 c. 
- International Confederation of Free Trade Unions (ICFTU), Ibid., Survey for each country . 
-  Existence and extent of racial 
discrimination in employment. 
 
-  Each minority as a percentage of total 
population. 
- Committee on the Elimination of Racial Discrimination (CERD), Concluding Observations, Survey 
for each country. 
- US Department of State, 1997, Ibid., section 5. 








-  Existence and extent of sexual 
discrimination and women 
empowerment in society. 
 
-  Discrimination in employment. 
 
-  Discrimination in education. 
- Committee on the Elimination of Discrimination Against Women (CEDAW), Concluding 
Observations, Survey for each country. 
- US Department of State, 1997, Ibid., section 5. 
- International Confederation of Free Trade Unions (ICFTU), Ibid., Survey for each country . 
- GEM, Gender Empowerment Measure. Source : UNPD, 1998, Human Development Report1988. 
- Women’s Labor Force Participation Rates. Source : World Bank, 2002, Ibid. 
- Indicators of discrimination in education 




-  Obstacles to freedom of association. 
 
-  Obstacles to the rights of striking and 
collective bargaining. 
 
-  Protection of trade unions adherents.  
- International Confederation of Free Trade Unions (ICFTU), 1998, Annual Survey of Violations of 
Trade Unions Rights, Brussels. 
- International Confederation of Free Trade Unions (ICFTU), Ibid., Survey for each country . 
- Number of strikes and lock-out per year. Source : ILO, 2002, LABORSTA. 
- Trade union rates.  
Source : ILO, 1997,World Employment Report 1997-98, Tableau 1.2 
  17Appendice 2 : List of countries and their level of Core Labor Standards. 
 
Countries are classified according to the value of the Core Labour Standards indicator (noted in 
brackets).  
 
Western and eastern Europe  America  Africa and Middle East  Asia 
Austria (1)  Argentina (0.75)   Algeria (0.58)  Australia (1) 
Belgium (1)  Brazil (0.25)   Côte d'Ivoire (0.25)  Bangladesh (0) 
Bulgaria (0.75)  Canada (1)   Egypt (0.33)  China (0.33) 
Czech Republic (0.92)  Chile (0.66)   Iran, I.R. of (0.33)  Hongkong (0.83) 
Denmark (1)  Colombia (0.5)   Israel (0.75)  India (0.08) 
Finland (1)  Dominican Rep. (0.16)      Kenya (0.25)  Indonesia (0.25) 
France (1)  Ecuador (0.5)   Morocco (0.42)  Japan (0.92) 
Germany (1)  Mexico (0.58)   Nigeria (0.25)  Korea (0.67) 
Greece (0.83)  Peru (0.25)   Saudi Arabia (0.33)  Malaysia (0.5) 
Hungary (0.83)  United States (0.83)   South Africa (0.67)  New Zealand (0.92) 
Ireland (1)  Venezuela (0.67)   Syrian Arab Rep. (0.33)  Pakistan (0) 
Italy (0.92)     Tunisia (0.58)  Philippines (0.08) 
Netherlands (1)     United Arab Emirates (0.42)  Singapore (0.75) 
Norway (1)     Zimbabwe (0.33)  Sri Lanka (0.5) 
Poland (0.92)          Thailand (0.08) 
Portugal (0.92)      Vietnam (0.33) 
Romania (0.83)       
Russia (0.75)       
Slovak Republic (0.92)       
Spain (0.92)           
Sweden (1)       
Switzerland (1)       
Turkey (0.42)       
United Kingdom (0.92)           
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Appendice 3 : First-stage regressions (IV method) 
 
TABLE 3: FIRST-STAGE REGRESSIONS (IV METHOD) 
  Instruments : Coast  
(and GNP-1, Schooling-1, Africa, 
Middle East, Asia) 
Instruments: Pop, Distance  
(and GNP-1, Schooling-1, Africa, 
Middle East, Asia) 
Dependant variable  Trade  GNP  Schooling  Trade  GNP  Schooling 
















































    
Pop       -0.00
** 
(0.00) 
-0.00 (0.00)  -0.00  
(0.00) 
Distance       -0.003 
(0.003) 
-0.03 (0.16)  -0.00005 
(0.00005) 




































R-squared  0.19 0.93  0.92 0.24 0.92  0.92 
Observations  55 55  55 55 55  55 
Sources : GNP, GNP-1,Pop and Trade (World Development Indicators 2002, World Bank) ; Schooling and Schooling-1 
(Barro and Lee, 2000); Coast and Distance (??) 
Significance level : *** 1%, ** 5%, * 10%. The standards errors are noted between brackets. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 